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Ahmet Ulvi Türkbağ, Istanbul / Turkey
 
 
The Bare Life and (the) Modern Law  
A Journey to Some Key Concepts or Conceptions of Agamben 
 
Abstract: This text is imitating a journey which tries to explore what is completely unknown. It starts  
Homo Sacer  and traces some key concepts namely der Muselmann, bare life, state of exception, 
sovereignty and  nihilism in law. Doing so, it hopes to reach a general picture of biopolitics or 
biopower according to Agamben. So, first part of this text generally tries to clarify some fundamental 
concepts or conceptions in order to use them for its aim. The second part suggests an alternative 
reading of Agamben, centered around his concept of der Muselmann which is the ultimate figure 
defined by Primo Levi and Agamben chooses the term because of its resemblance to or representation 
of Homo Sacer. Der Muselmann was a derogatory term in its origin and very meaning has still been 
unclear today. So, the second part tries to clarify the meaning of der Muselmann (and unbaptized 
babies) from a different outlook, not from outside but inside of the referred concept. It tries to show a 
Muslim’s image of a non Muslim world in order to reveal what are the very meanings of sovereignty, 
law and biopolitics. So at the end of the journey, this text hopes to reach a different picture of modern 
life and a modern law.  
Keywords: Biopolitics, biopower, Bare Life, Homo Sacer, Der Muselmann, Agamben, Enlightenment, 
Turkish sociological positivism, postmodern thought 
 
Introduction 
 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in 
the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that 
was made. 
                                                                                                                Gospel of John, 1-3 
 
Like the Gospel, postmodern thought (if postmodernists let me call them a logically coherent 
theoretical and practical movement) puts ‘word’ –language- at the peak level of their theory 
and  terminology.  It  could  be  modesty  or  falling  back  after  losing  the  battle  with  natural 
sciences. In postmodern thought ‘word’ is not only in the beginning but also at the end, more 
truly word is everything or word is all for the philosophical realm. Nothing would be apart 
from or beyond it. Agamben is a master of ‘word’ and one of the most popular thinkers of the 
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last two decades. Before I dwell upon some concepts of his theory, I prefer to give a little 
explanation about postmodern thought and its obsession with language. 
What is the core of postmodern thought of which Agamben is a part? It is not a question 
which  is  easily  answerable,  but  the  main  point  of  postmodern  thought  can  roughly  be 
summarized in two themes: 
 
1. Denying Descartes and every form or version of Cartesian philosophy.   
2. Denying universality and the paranoiac knowledge of Enlightenment.  
 
What  is  wrong  about  Descartes  related to  Cogito? As was  to be  expected Descartes 
vigorously tried to find a criterion with which we can differentiate what true knowledge is, 
instead of unpopular religious explanations. When he reached Cogito (I think therefore, I am) 
he believed that every subjective psychological condition resembling Cogito would be as true 
as Cogito. So he used his criterion in every aspect of his theory and sciences practices. But 
Cogito was not everlasting as he assumed. Cogito was grounded on its initial character and its 
priority depended on language. Cogito required or assumed language so not only its priority 
but also its uniqueness collapsed.   
From  the  postmodern  point  of  view  everlasting  and  unhistorical  universal  principles 
which covered every situation and addressed every problem could not be. Every situation or 
instance deserves to be handled in its special conditions. Especially in law, the sociological 
revolution –which took place at the end of 19
th and at the beginning of 20
th century- reflected 
this understanding before the postmodern era. In the United States American Legal Realism 
was absolutely against general principles of law, including even highly abstract formulations 
which were contented in legal rules. In France, François Gény preferred a moderate way but 
overly stressed the importance of social facts in law. In Turkey (Ottoman Empire) there was a 
parallel development and Ziya Gokalp tried to construct sociologically based law.
1  
The symbol of modernism is certitude of knowledge. Modern thought accepted that 
natural and social life was completely open to human mind so human beings were able to 
have true knowledge about nature and themselves. But modern thought presented some meta-
narratives  instead  of  the  ‘truth’.  It  certainly  accepted  that  it  has  the  universal  truths  and 
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Gokalp tried to construct in a series of articles, “Ictimai Usul-u Fikih” (Sociological Methods of Law), a special 
method of law. His method has two fundamentals: first like the German Historical School, law to be cultural 
determined and sensitive local differences; second each legal decision, judicial or administrative, should be an 
outcome of not general principles but special conditions of each case.  3 
everybody had to  agree with  it. Dissenters of  modern thought  qualified its  gesture about 
knowledge as being ‘paranoiac’.
2     
This certainty, this paranoia (!) has important social, political and legal outcomes: not 
only the whole world is knowable but also changeable by human beings. Human beings do 
not have a nature but give themselves “…a historical nature, and does this on the basis of a 
sedimentation  that  consists  of  older  nature,  which  in  turn  are  historically  produced 
sedimentations as well”.
3 Human being or Man is not a nature-made creature but a historical 
or artificial one. He can be forged, bodily and mentally by discipline. Kant opined “… the 
way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject”. But this freedom becomes a problem 
of truth.     
This unfolding of truth as a process would be a history of those ways in which man has 
constituted himself as at once a subject and an object, explicated his relation to himself, and 
opened up a space of self-reflection in a ‘truth game’. In this perspective Foucault speaks of a 
‘hermeneutics of self’ that would relate not to that which is ‘true or false in knowledge, but to 
an  analysis  of  those  truth  games,  the  games  with  the  true  and  the  false  in  which  being 
constituted historically as experience, i.e. as something that can and ought to be thought.’ In 
this sense, life is also a self-relation, and the power exerted over life is also an emancipation 
of resistant force inside of life.      
The term ‘Biopolitics’ and ‘biopower’ should then not be understood solely in terms of 
an action that imparts form to some amorphous mass, but as a complex of action and reaction, 
control and resistance.
4  
In this context one of the far sources of biopolitics is the assumption of Enlightenment, in 
which human beings are able to know every aspect of life and even they can be shaped by this 
knowledge. But it is not enough to create biopolitics solely. At the end of the 19
th century 
rapid development in biology and anthropology got high respect and interest in these sciences 
which was symbolized by Darwin’s Selection Theory. And the same historical period and 
conditions  introduced  a  new  science:  sociology,  which  completely  covers  whole  areas  of 
human  life.  So  social  sciences,  especially  sociology  and  politics,  even  law  –if  we  call  it 
‘science’-  became  gradually  more  ‘scientific’;  namely  they  tried  to  use  natural  sciences 
methods and to emulate them. Biology was the leading science used by social sciences to 
demonstrate their scientific quality. A similar development occurred in the 17
th century but 
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 4 
instead of biology, physics, especially mechanics, was the model science which was thought 
should be imitated to be as scientific as natural sciences.    
For  example,  legal  positivism  was  a  product  of  the  aforementioned  development  or 
general tendency to apply natural sciences’ techniques to social sciences in order to reach 
congruent objectivity and success. This tendency reached a peak in the modern era and went 
beyond its limits with a softly declined curve. One of the current theories, for instance Niklas 
Luhmann’s  system  theory,  is  completely  grounded  in  biology  with  its  key  concept: 
autopoiesis. So biopolitics is a reflection or appearance in human area which is deliberately 
‘biologized’. It can be easily described that ‘to be taking continual control of human bodies by 
the state’.  
This modest definition is used in this article for the sake of argument. Der Muselmann 
(that  roughly  refers  people  who  were  at  the  point  of  death  because  of  starvation  and 
inhumanly conditions in the camps) as Agamben has said, could be considered an example of 
the extreme in the camp, namely that a human body is absolutely controlled. 
 
I. La Nuda Vita (Bare Life or Naked Life) 
“The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may 
be killed and yet not sacrificed, and whose essential function in modern politics we intend to 
assert."
5  
Is it extremely interesting? Is it a shocking sentence? I think it is not, but Agamben’s and his 
masterpiece’s popularities assert so beyond any discussion.  So in political theory and in 
philosophy of law or legal theory every current study must confront some of Agamben’s 
concepts, especially the most famous one: La Nuda Vita (bare life).  
According to de la Durantaye, ‘bare life’ is not only a translation but also “a quotation 
without quotation marks from Benjamin”, specifically his concept of ‘das bloße leben’ which 
Benjamin  invoked  and  employed  in  his  Destiny  and  Character  and  The  Critique  of   
Violence.
6 But whatever its origin bare life belongs to Agamben, it was an old project that had  
taken a long time to be realized.
7   
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Agamben’s biopolitics, indeed debatable, are special to him. It is quite different from 
Foucault’s.  It  can  be  said  that  his  thoughts  are  closer  to  Heidegger’s  and  Arent’s  than 
Foucault’s. He has a unique or specific style which is briefly discussed in the last part of this 
article. The hero of its biopolitics is Bare Life, that is another name for the human creature 
and is the life of homo sacer.
8 Bare life is not a prior substance like state of nature or initial 
position, but instead what remains after the withdrawal of all forms.
9 It may just be similar to 
Weber’s  archetypes.  Similar  to  Weber,  who  uses  archetypes  to  explain  and  to  interpret 
complex  situations,  Agamben  uses  bare  life  to  show  deep  contradictions  in  modern 
institutions like politics and law. Or if it was needed to find a more historical example, his 
bare life would be compared to William of Ockham’s razor because his concept (bare life) is 
as sharp as the razor.  
Not only bare life but also other key concepts of Agamben have a special function which 
brings back to the reader Ocham’s razor. But before discussing these concepts and impact of 
its outcome upon law, Agamben’s argumentation should be traced briefly. To clarify bare life, 
he writes “The living being has logos by taking away and conserving its own voice in it, even 
as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, within it” and 
he  accepts  that  politics  is  a  fundamental  structure  of  Western  metaphysics  which  means 
politicization of bare life and Modernity shares the task.  
The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but bare 
life/political  existence,    zoē/  bios,  exclusion/inclusion…Instead  the  decisive  fact  is    that, 
together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, realm of bare 
life —which had originally been situated in a relation of abandonment at the margins of the 
polis—‘gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, 
outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction’. 
At  once  excluding  bare  life  from  and  capturing  it  within  the  political  order,  the  state  of 
exception actually constituted, in its very separateness the hidden foundation on which the 
entire system rested.
10  
 
Alike the statute of homo sacer (bare life) in archaic Roman law where  “human life is 
included in the juridical order in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), 
modern Western politics and legal order rested on the exceptional situation not as exception 
but  as  a  rule.  Agamben  links  Western  politics  to  Aristotle,  who  associates  politics  with 
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activity. So because it is defined in relation with ergon, politics is politics of activity and not 
of inactivity or potentiality and  ergon, as a certain kind of life, is defined mainly by the 
exclusion of bare life.
11 Aristotle’s definition in an aporetic style carries politics to biopolitics 
because it limits politics to the realm of individual human activities and bares differentiation 
and articulation of zoē. Agamben sums up the matter: “The political, as the work of man as 
man, is drawn out of the living being through the exclusion –as unpolitical- of a part of vital 
activity”.
12 About ‘work of man’ he carries far his main source’s thoughts. Aristotle separates 
nutritive life as a base condition of all forms of life, and Agamben finds, in this conception, 
the roots of Western philosophy and as a bare life, of modern biopolitics: 
Aristotle’s isolation of general presupposition of nutritive life, Agamben suggests, served 
to mark divisions in the human –between vegetative and relational life, animal and human- 
which were then expressed in the political realm in the form of those distinctions between zoē 
and bios, and mere life (zen) and that good life (eu zen) that play a central role in Aristotle’s 
determination of telos of politics and work of man”.
13     
 
II. Sovereignty 
Another crucial concept in Agamben’s biopolitics is sovereignty which is defined by ban, a 
poetic phrase ‘inclusive exclusion’. Additionally, Agamben’s sovereignty is posited against 
Schmitt’s articulation about the matter in his Political Theology. Schmitt defines sovereignty 
as  an  ability  to  decide  on  exception  and  it  resembles  miracle  in  theology  because  when 
miracle  happens  everybody  has  to  accept  that  God  exists,  so  when  state  of  exception  is 
proclaimed everybody has to accept that the sovereign which was able to decide on it exists. 
Agamben modifies Schmitt’s argumentation and introduces a spatial theory of sovereignty.
14 
He speaks of the ‘topological structure of state of exception’ and state of exception, like bare 
life,  is  a  threshold  that  is  at  a  point  between  inside  and  outside  where  it  so  continually 
functions in favor of sovereign that it gives him an ability to capture the strategic point.  
The sovereign, who can decide on the state of exception, guarantees its anchorage to the 
juridical order. But precisely because the decision here concerns the very annulment of the 
norm, that is, because the state of exception represents the inclusion and capture of a space 
that is neither outside nor inside (the space that corresponds to the annulled and suspended 
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norm)… being  outside and yet  belonging:  this is  the topological  structure of the state of 
exception, and only because the sovereign who decided on the exception is, in truth, logically 
defined  in  his  being  by  the  exception,  can  he  be  (to)  defined  by  the  oxymoron  ecstasy-
belonging.
15   
Agamben elaborately evolves exception theory in his book,  State of Exception. He does 
etymological and archeological investigation, gives a lot of examples but one of them is more 
important than others.  His gives, as an extreme in biopolitics, Nazi example. Apart from 
Agamben, Nazi is the best example of unifying biology and politics whole their theory and 
governmental practices. It is the Nazi’s motto that in the Third Reich ‘the words of the Führer 
have the force of law’.
16 He continues his analysis with the anomic character of the state of 
exception. But this motto, ‘the words of the Führer have the force of law’ deserves a little 
more attention in order to clarify the very meaning of sovereignty. But this analysis requires a 
pause in Agamben’s succession of thoughts. It will be interesting (that) suspending his logical 
succession  in  order  to  clarify  his  theory  about  suspending  a  legal  order  in  the  state  of 
exception.
17 
In the middle of the 19
th century Germany’s legal life was dominated by F. Carl Von 
Savigny’s Historical school.
18 The main tenets of this school can be listed as follows: (1) 
every legal  system  is  or should be a production of local  culture (volksgeist), law should 
emerge from this culture like values and other social rules in the course of history. So law 
(volksrecht) has to have special roots within a society which it prevails, if it governs people’s 
day to day relations. (2) It is meaningless to import any legal rule from external cultures, 
namely codification is not a good way to posit some legal rules. Because all cultures have 
authentic  and  specific  complex  of  values  supporting  subconsciously  whole  social  rules. 
Contrary to this social fact, imported rules could not have this support and additionally have 
compatibility problems.  They would artificially be applied only if they were supported too 
many outer-official sanctions. (3) Legal rules can be created or designed like pieces of art. 
Jurist’s main duty is not to create law but to compile it in a logically coherent way and to put 
it into writing.  
However,  the  German  Historical  School  in  the  course  of  time  changed  and  got  a 
conservative character. It tried to limit law with Romanic institutions and concepts, and never 
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let a judge have any discretional space. It called Roman law Ratio Scripta, written or printed 
wisdom, and championed gemeines Recht and pandect Recht.
19 Two schools of thought were 
brought about as a reaction to this modification in Historical School:  Interessenjurisprudenz 
and Freirechtslehre. The latter would be one of Schmitt’s sources of inspiration, at least as a 
major contributor to the German climate of thoughts at that time, and had an effect upon 
Agamben, too. Freirechtslehre, Free law is an idealistic approach to law and tries to liberate a 
judge from the wording of statutes. According to Free Law, a judge should reach his decision 
in each case’s unique conditions and be only guided by justice or equity which means, so to 
speak, ‘haute couture’ decision that is far from the legal, positivistic ideal of uniformity. But 
after  the  Nazis  had  come  to  power  they  distorted  the  school’s  thought  and  modified  its 
method by national socialist principles. Agamben’s quoted phrase from Eichman ‘the words 
of the Führer have the force of law’ is  only the tip of the iceberg that demonstrates the 
absolute power of the Führer. The Nazi regime unfortunately or unexpectedly applied the 
school’s principles to law and threatened not only rights but also the concept of law itself. 
German Criminal  Code amendment  on 28 June 1935 showed the seriousness  of the new 
concept of laws: 
Punishment is to be inflicted on any person who commits an act declared by the law to be 
punishable, or which, in the light of basic purpose of criminal law, and according to healthy 
popular  feeling  [gesundes  Volksempfinden],  deserves  to  be  punished.  If  no  criminal  law 
applies directly to such an act, it is to be punished according to whatever law, in its basic 
purpose, best applies to it.
20  
In a nutshell it means a big change in the fundamental principle of criminal law which is 
vitally important for protecting rights via law:  fundamental principle of  nullum crimen sine 
lege became nullum crimen sine poena.
21 This change’s outcome related Agamben’s the state 
of exception (and sovereignty) theory not only in the exceptional situation but also all times it 
situates the sovereign a threshold, as Agamben puts it, “the inclusion and capture of a space 
that is neither outside nor inside” law. So the sovereign’s being which bears on the exception 
is  not  an  exceptional  one,  it  is,  so  to  say,  ever-exceptional  one.  Because,  thanks  to  his 
continual exceptional character, the sovereign is able to be sovereign and if he needed he 
would suspend law. But in normal times that legal system functions without any exception, 
the  sovereign’s  position  is  even  exceptional  because  of  being  ‘anchorage  to  the  juridical 
order’, namely the legal order completely bears on this exceptional character of sovereign like 
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a  pole  or  highest  criterion.  But  his  sovereign  character  is  different  from,  according  to 
Agamben, Schmitt’s and Kelsen’s because it is not an exclusively political concept. Their 
sovereign can form and guide juridical order but they cannot be determined by any legal inner 
factor of it. Agamben differentiates the sovereign position which is determined and formed by 
the exception, in front of law as follows: 
If the exception is the structure of sovereignty, then sovereignty is not an exclusively 
political concept, an exclusively juridical category, a power external to law (Schmitt), or the 
supreme the rule of the, juridical order (Hans Kelsen): it is the originary structure in which 
law refers to law and includes it in itself by suspending it.
22     
In order to illuminate his sovereign position exactly, he uses a legal concept: ban. Ban is 
one of the fundamental institutions in law. It can be related with ‘prohibit’ and ‘forbid’ or old 
‘Church’s curse’. But he took ban from J.L. Nancy and uses it as a special meaning that 
shows  a  critical  position,  a  threshold  or  extreme  situation.  Nancy  wrote  in  his  book 
Abandoned being. In The birth to presence: 
 
[b]andon is an order, a prescription, a decree, a permission and the power that holds these 
freely at its   disposal. To abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over to such a sovereign power, 
and to remit, entrust, or turn over to its ban, that is, to its proclaiming, to its convening, and to 
its  sentencing.  The  law  of  abandonment  requires  that  the  law  be  applied  through  its 
withdrawal. Abandoned being finds itself deserted to the degree that it finds itself remitted, 
entrusted, or thrown to this law.
23  
 
According to Agamben ban is analogous with structure of sovereignty, namely the state of 
exception, ban’s Germanic origin: “…designates both exclusion from the community and the 
command and insignia of the sovereign”. He added: “The relation of exception is a relation of 
ban”.
24  Ban’s  relation creates a threshold position that is  both  exclusive and inclusive or 
banned and abandoned. The person, who has been banned, is neither inside nor outside the 
law and the juridical order and the life.   
He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent 
to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life 
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24 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 28 10 
and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable… The originary relation of law to life 
is not an application but abandonment.
25          
Agamben’s description of the original relation of law to life seems extremely pessimistic. 
A banned person is excluded but at the same time captured by law. Roughly, in its extreme, 
people subject to law are both banned and held in a position that they have been at the mercy 
of the sovereign. As a symbol of this relation, abandonment, Agamben introduces us two 
examples;  the  first  one  is  old  and  conceptual  but  the  second  one  is  relatively  new  and 
impressive. First one is homo sacer and the second one, as a concrete and modern form of  
homo sacer is der Muselmann.      
 
III. Homo Sacer and Der Muselmann 
The characteristic of Homo Sacer is that he ‘may be killed but yet not sacrificed’. Like other 
concepts which Agamben uses, Homo Sacer is too a threshold situation.  It can be asked a 
question about homo sacer that why could not he be sacrificed although he could be killed? In 
order to answer this question, one needs to think about briefly two components of the subject: 
Homo sacer’s legal and religious statutes. 
First,  Homo  Sacer’s  legal  status  can  be  illuminating  to  understand  perfectly  modern 
politics and the relation between people and law. Homo Sacer is continually subject to and at 
the mercy of juridical order and of the sovereign. He is not completely outside or inside the 
juridical order but he is at the limit position which resembles the purgatory life of souls. 
Purgatory (Gehenna in Judaism or Araf in Islam) is a unique position, a no man’s land which 
is neither Heaven nor Hell and souls in purgatory are completely left to the grace of God. 
Their purification cannot depend on their choices like in the world but they are in the hands of 
God.  
The second important point is religious statue of sacrifice, because Homo Sacer cannot 
be  sacrificed. Sacrifice etymologically comes from sacer (holy), so the logical conclusion of 
this homo sacer, because of being sacer (sacred), should be sacrificed. But it cannot. The 
determination  between  sacred  things  and  non  sacred  (things),  profane  things  is  the  base 
difference for a religion. Durkheim asserted that, in Elementary Forms of Religion, the core of 
religion is not related to God or any higher spiritual being but related to sacred things and non 
sacred things. Additionally a sacred thing or person is set aside and forbidden: 
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Sacred things are those things protected and isolated by prohibitions; profane things are 
those things to which such prohibitions apply and which must keep their distance from what 
is sacred. Religious beliefs are representations that express the nature of sacred things and the 
relations they sustain among themselves or with profane things. Finally, rites are rules of 
conduct that prescribe how man conducts himself with sacred things.
26             
Sacrifice (or victim, Korban in Judaism and Qurbani in Islam) is one of the oldest 
practices which is shared by almost all religious beliefs. The key question about the concept 
of sacrifice is that what are the necessary qualities which are required to be a sacrifice? They 
are different in cultures and religions but generally these qualities which a victim has to have 
are as follows: to be clean, healthy and a perfect member of its species, for instance if a lamp 
was separated for sacrifice it would be a good lamp. When a human is a sacrifice the required 
qualities are the same. So, if homo sacer cannot be sacrificed it should be imperfect, dirty or 
unhealthy. Additionally, every sacrifice who is sacrificed becomes sacred or holy because of 
being separated and adored for God so it is related with or closed to God. The logical outcome 
of this is that homo sacer cannot be sacred because he cannot be sacrificed and so, what is the 
very meaning of ‘sacer’? It is a historical concept and currently hard to know what ‘sacer’  
meant or why people of Rome called a person as ‘homo sacer’ who was not sacred. When 
thinking on process of being homo sacer it can be firstly said that sacer was ironic!  It stands 
to reason then that because Homo sacer is not human and is not sacred, he can be killed 
without any legal responsibility or the probability of punishment for whoever killed him. His 
life has no worth or value; he is inhuman, not because of being sacred, a holy thing behind 
human but because of being a worthless thing, less than human. Briefly, ‘sacer’ can be meant 
in these steps of logic as an adjective, ironic and pejorative or humiliating.  
Der Muselmann, as a kind of modern form of homo sacer, is an analogous concept too. 
Agamben built Remnants of Auschwitz the Witness and the Archives (Homo Sacer III) almost 
completely on der Muselmann (and on, as a counterpoint, sonderkommando in order to show 
how  the  horrible  experiences  in  the  camp  became  routine)  and  accepted  the  camps  as  a 
milestone of ethics. He briefly states the matter in his preface before the long collaboration of 
the book: 
 
Above all, it made it necessary to clear away almost all the doctrines that, since Auschwitz, 
have  been  advanced  in  the  name  of  ethics.  As  we  shall  see,  almost  none  of  the  ethical 
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principles our age believed it could recognize as valid have stood the decisive test, that of an 
Ethica more Auschwitz demonstrata.
27    
 
According to him like ‘we can never write a poem’ after Auschwitz, we cannot assert any 
coherent ethical claim as a conclusion of an ethical theory that could pass the test of the 
Camp. But his sharp critique is not limited by ethics and he moves along to law. Agamben 
certainly denies any ethical reference and ethical dimension to law. Additionally, he totally 
disclaims any function of law in reaching or discovering truth. So he wrote, in a nihilist tone, 
that the sole function of law is to reach a res judicata, a formal non-debatable truth of law and 
to put it in place of justice or truth.    
 
As jurists well know, law is not directed toward the establishment of justice. Nor is it 
directed to the verification of truth. Law is solely directed toward judgment, independent of 
truth and justice. This is shown beyond doubt by the force of judgment that even an unjust 
sentence carries with it. The ultimate aim of law is the production of a res judicata, in which 
the sentence becomes the substitute for the true and the just, being held as true despite its 
falsity and injustice. Law finds peace in this hybrid creature, of which it is      impossible to 
say if it is fact or rule; once law has produced its res judicata, it cannot go any further. 
28        
“Hybrid creature”, Agaben calls res judicata (judged matter) in order to draw attention to 
its monstrous, contradictory double character which is composed of fact and rule. The Fact – 
Rule  problem  is  one  of  the  most  challenging  problems  of  law.  Legal  practice  generally 
accepts the forward progression from rule to event, so it means the application of the rule 
which is most related to the event. But in the long history of legal theory some schools and 
figures cast doubt upon this process. American Legal Realism, for instance, is a well known 
representative of that point of view. According to the Realist Movement rule, the application 
process is just opposite to that which is generally accepted. So judges and other functionaries 
that  have  to  apply  legal  rules  ex  officio  do  not  forward  from  rule  to  event  and  reach  a 
decision;  just the opposite,  they  reach their decision via a semi-conscious way. They are 
guided by a mixture which is composed of opinions, beliefs, prejudices, sexual incentives, etc. 
and reach a decision. After that process they try to find reasons and to demonstrate that how 
the decision, which at best they found by intuition, is a logical outcome of a legal rule. Fact 
skeptics and rule skeptics in the Realist movement focus on different parts of legal practice.  
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The former worries about the facts of the legal issue which are one of the major determining 
elements of a judge’s decision, and the latter worries about whether or not a   judge’s decision 
really was a logical outcome of the rule which is the most related with the legal issue, or if his 
political and personal choices affected the decision.  
The Fact-Rule problem is not limited only by the application process of law but also 
forms the core theoretical problem of law. It can be put as follows: law is composed of rules 
(legal positivist outlook), a rule is an ‘ought to be’ but fact is a ‘to be’ and res judicata must 
intrinsically be a hybrid. So it has a Janus face: one looks at rule (ought to be) and the other 
looks at fact (to be), and it is needed to give an answer not only to the question that can it be 
possible  to  move  forward  from  highly  abstract,  general  principles  to  concrete,  individual 
situations and to introduce a coherent solution which can be seen, at first sight, to be strictly 
the outcome of these principles, and but also how can it be reached from ‘to be’ to ‘ought to 
be’ namely, Hume’s famous dilemma, from fact to rule? Additionally, when Agamben rejects 
any ethical theory after the camp experience, it becomes impossible to find any solution in the 
ethical content of law referring to natural law theories. But legal positivist approaches, against 
Agamben’s criticism, are as hopeless as natural law. Because apart from the justice or truth 
when the  final word was  said  in a case, and  despite the  fact  that  everybody  accepts  the 
possibility  of  wrong  or  deficient  decisions,  res  judicata  emerged  with  the  justification  of 
practical requirements. This overly formal nature of law, which legal positivists try to stand 
via neutrality and uniformity to reach objectivity, together with the disability of ethics in 
which natural law theorists try to escape from rules or decisions only formally valid but not 
just, carries Agamben to a nihilist edge.  
Der Muselmann is a key and interesting concept, similar to the other concepts which 
Agamben  used  in  his  writings.  But  it  has  a  unique  character  which  is  not  only  sharply 
separated from the others but also has a specific, multi- dimensional meaning. For the sake of 
clearness the dimension of its meaning can be traced from the surface to the deep. At first 
sight it is one of the extremely pejorative or humiliating terms which was used in the camps.   
 
“The expression was in common use especially in Auschwitz, from where it spread to 
other camps as well… In Majdanek, the word was unknown. The living dead there were 
termed  ‘donkeys’;  in  Dachau  they  were    ‘cretins,’  in  Stutthof  ‘cripples,’  in  Mauthausen 14 
‘swimmers,’ in Neuengamme ‘camels’, in Buchenwald ‘tired sheiks,’ and in the women’s 
camp known as Ravensbrück, Muselweiber (female muslims) or ‘trinkets’”.
29 
 
Some of the other terms which were used instead of Muselmann, for example donkeys or 
camels, are rough; the others, for example cretins, cripples or trinkets refer to inhuman or less 
than human qualities. But it is a more interesting point that together with these pejorative 
terms Muselmann or Muselweiber, which are not generally a pejorative terms, were used in 
order to humiliate people at the point of death. It could have been to show popular prejudice 
in West European culture against Islam. Agamben is very far from ethnocentrism and thanks 
to his perfection at language he never uses any ‘improper’ word or phrase which gives rise to 
misunderstanding. But despite this careful approach what is the exact meaning of Muselmann, 
why  did  Nazi  SS  officers  (Christians-Protestants)  call  prisoners  (Jews)  Muselmann 
(Muslims)? It is a well-known fact that the three big and most common religions in the World 
are called Semitic religions or Abrahamic religions because they share the same origin and 
ancestry.  Apart  from  their  historical  mutual  hostility  or  from  11  September  (or  a  decade 
earlier Huntington’s Clash of the Civilization thesis), it is generally accepted, by religious 
authority that they are more closely doctrinaire than generally thought. Despite this fact der 
Muselmann was able to be used as a pejorative adjective and Agamben gives an explanation 
for this strange usage: 
 
The most likely explanation of the term can be found in the literal meaning of the Arabic 
word muslim: the one who submits unconditionally to the will of God. It is this meaning that 
lies at the origin of the legends concerning Islam’s supposed fatalism, legends which are 
found in European culture starting with the Middle Ages (this deprecatory sense of term is 
present in European languages, particularly in Italian). But while the muslim’s resignation 
consist in the conviction that the will of Allah is at work every moment and in even the 
smallest events, the Muselmann of Auschwitz is instead defined by a loss of all will and 
consciousness.
30  
 
He quoted a Muselmann’s definition from Kogon: “relatively large group of men who had 
long  since  lost  any  real  will  to  survive…  were  called  ‘Moslems’  –men  of  unconditional 
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fatalism”.
31Agamben, with extraordinary care, uses the same words and phrases: ‘legends’ 
‘supposed fatalism’ but he accepts its pejorative meaning by using a less disturbing word 
‘deprecatory’. His brief explanation about the source of Muselmann is good but it seems not 
enough because he not only dedicated a whole part to der Muselmann in his book (Remnants 
of Auschwitz) and its important role in his whole theory but also did not take into account the 
psychological effects upon his readers. Many of his readers may have a memory in his mind, 
consciously or unconsciously, of one of the pejoratives or at least the deprecatory Muslim 
definitions that their common ground is that they are inhuman or less than human men who 
are  deprived  of  character,  a  man  without  personality,  for  instance  men  of  unconditional 
fatalism.  
On  the  other  hand,  apart  from  any  legend,  Islam  has  a  belief  about  fate  or  destiny 
(predetermination), different from the other Semitic religions. The concept of fate in Islam 
(qadar), in a nutshell, has different and conflicting definitions or conceptions according to 
different religious sects.
32 There are four major sects (theological schools) whose explanations 
and conceptions about qadar are important and prevailed in the course of history.
33 The first 
one is  Cebriye. After the age of Rashidun caliphates (632-660), it was the official sect of 
Umayyad caliphates (661-750) and had a more political orientation than a religious one. It 
tried to get absolute obedience to the caliphates. In order to achieve this aim, its conception of 
qadar is very strict and it completely accepts predestination so denies free will. If the only sect 
in Islam were Cebriye, it would be right to assume that Muslims have no will and choice so 
they disavow their personality. The second one is Mu’tazili (Qadariyah Qadariya). Although 
it  was  not  official  it  was  the  favorite  sect  of  Abbasid  caliphates  (750-1258).  The  qadar 
conception of followers of Mu’tazili was just opposite to Cebriye. They influenced ancient 
Greek philosophy and complied with Islam. They almost completely denied predestination 
(God, Allah, only created the World, gave human being reason and free will and at the end of 
the World, human beings will be responsible for their choices). So qadar is a determinant at 
the beginning and at the end. The third one is Ehli Sunnet. The followers of Ehli Sunnet 
divide the will into two parts: one of them is Allah’s will which is called İrade-I Külliye (the 
Total Will) and the other is called İrade-i Cüziye (the Partial Will). Every human being is 
given İrade-i Cüziye (the Partial Will) by Allah in order to chose right (good) and deny wrong 
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(bad). The last conception of qadar belongs to Shia Islam, Shi’at-ul Ali (Ali’s Way). About 
qadar, it is similar to Mu’tezili and accepts free will. It gives more weight to inner, spiritual 
life than acts of worship.  Ehli Sunnet’s conception of qadar is a most common conception. 
Agamben chose Muselmann because of their  extreme position. He indeed knows SS 
officers did not mean that the living death Jew prisoners became Muslim. Despite this fact he 
wrote  discussions  about  what  the  exact  meaning  of  Muselmann  is,  and  then  wrote  an 
interesting sentence: “In any case, it is certain that, with a kind of ferocious irony, the Jews 
know  that  they  would  not  die  in  Auschwitz  as  Jews”.
34  Tragically,  some  of  the  Jews  in 
Auschwitz,  because of the camps conditions, lost their basic ability to decide and choose 
about their lives, namely to die as humans. Agamben continues, in his own term, this kind of 
‘ferocious irony’ and instead of ‘would not die in Auschwitz as Human’, writes ‘would not 
die in Auschwitz as Jews’. So der Muselmann extreme position changed from between life 
and death to human and inhuman or Muselmann.  
 
Conclusion 
Agamben’s  political  philosophy  and  his  ideas  about  law  are  genuine.  His  excellence  in 
language and his free associative style are impressive. Besides his works and philosophical 
depth, he shows his talent and supremacy over European culture. The general characteristics 
of Agamben’s works can be stated as follows: 
1. He studies European history, languages and culture. He refers to the other cultures 
only in the context of connection to European culture.  
2. He mostly uses in his political works etymology and ancient Roman Law institutions 
and concepts to illuminate current concepts or institutions.    
3. He is not an analytic philosopher  - his logical succession is not strict.    
4. He focuses generally on marginal, extreme situations and he uses them as a criterion in 
order to test political or legal assertions, theories or generally accepted ideas. It is similar to 
the history of science that gravity continually has been playing a testifying role in theories and 
‘the logic of scientific discovery’, in the course of history, stands this unusual phenomenon 
that present theories cannot give any satisfactory explanation.  
On the other hand in politics or especially law, can Agamben’s impressive explanation be 
useful? Before any answer is given one should think of some real functions of law. Law is a 
social institution which is expected to solve urgent social problems. A judge in a courtroom in 
front  of  parties,  claimant  and  litigant,  has  to  reach  a  decision.  A  judge  cannot  settle  for 
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criticizing a specific norm, a legal system or a concept of law. But this does not mean that 
Agamben is wrong or he unrightfully criticizes firm institutions of a society. Although he 
seems to have a pessimistic outlook, he insists that he is hopeful about a different future:     
Until a completely new politics—that is a politics no longer founded on the exceptio of 
bare life—is at hand, every theory and every praxis will remain imprisoned and immobile, 
and the ‘beautiful day’ of life will be  given citizenship only either through blood and death or 
in the perfect senselessness to which the society of  the spectacle condemns it.
35 
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